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The Economic Journal Volume , Issue Miltiadis Makris University of Exeter Search for more papers by this author. Read the full text. Tools Request permission Export citation Add to favorites Track citation.
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Related Information. Auctioning, yardistick competition, incentive schemes, auditing, regulation through competition are the keywords for the renewed public involvment in public transit. All these mechanisms can be properly studied within the theoretical format of the incentives theory.
This approach helps us to understand past experiences of transit firms incentives scheme and to appreciate the relevance of the empirical analysis of performance indicators. An important question that emerges is the definition of operational incentive contracts. In this paper we will discuss this problem by referring to past and recent experiments with performance based subsidization programs.
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